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Abstract. Recently, it has been shown how McEliece public-key cryp-
tosystems based on moderate-density parity-check (MDPC) codes al-
low for very compact keys compared to variants based on other code
families. In this paper, classical (iterative) decoding schemes for MPDC
codes are considered. The algorithms are analyzed with respect to their
error-correction capability as well as their resilience against a recently
proposed reaction-based key-recovery attack on a variant of the MDPC-
McEliece cryptosystem by Guo, Johansson and Stankovski (GJS). New
message-passing decoding algorithms are presented and analyzed. Two
proposed decoding algorithms have an improved error-correction per-
formance compared to existing hard-decision decoding schemes and are
resilient against the GJS reaction-based attack for an appropriate choice
of the algorithm’s parameters. Finally, a modified belief propagation de-
coding algorithm that is resilient against the GJS reaction-based attack
is presented.
Keywords: McEliece cryptosystem, QC-MDPC codes, post-quantum
cryptography
1 Introduction
In 1978, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) proposed a pubilic-key cryptosystem
whose security is based on the hard problem of factoring large integers. Since
then, the RSA cryptosystem is used in most state-of-the art communication
systems and is included in many communication standards. In 1999, Shor pre-
sented a factorization algorithm for quantum computers that is able to factor
large integers in polynomial time [1]. Thus, assuming that quantum computer
of sufficient scale can be built one day, the RSA cryptosystem can be broken
in polynomial time rendering most of today’s communication systems insecure.
This result gives rise to developing cryptosystems that are post-quantum secure.
In the same year as RSA, McEliece proposed a cryptosystem based on error-
correcting codes [2]. The security of the scheme relies on the hardness of decoding
an unknown linear code and thus is resilient against efficient factorization attacks
by quantum algorithms like Shor’s algorithm. One drawback of the scheme is the
large key size and the rate-loss compared to the RSA cryptosystem. Variants of
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2the McEliece cryptosystem based on different code families were considered in
the past (e.g. rank-metric codes [3], random codes [4]). In particular, McEliece
cryptosystems based on low-density parity-check (LDPC) allow for very small
keys but suffer from feasible attacks on the low-weight dual code due to the
sparse parity-check matrix [4]. Variants based on quasi-cyclic (QC)-LDPC codes
that use row and column scrambling matrices to increase the density of the
public code parity-check matrix [5] allow for structural attacks [6]. The family
of moderate-density parity-check (MDPC) codes admit a parity-check matrix
of moderate density,1 yielding codes with large minimum distance [7]. In [8] a
McEliece cryptosystem based on QC-MDPC codes that defeats information set
decoding attacks on the dual code due to the moderate density parity-check
matrix is presented. For a given security level, the QC-MDPC cryptosystem
allows for very small key sizes compared to other McEliece variants.
Recently, Guo, Johansson and Stankovski (GJS) presented a reaction-based
key-recovery attack on the QC-MDPC system [9]. This attack reveals the parity-
check matrix by observing the decoding failure probability for chosen ciphertexts
that are constructed with error patterns which have a specific structure. A mod-
ified version of the attack can break a system that uses CCA-2 secure conver-
sions [10].
In this paper we analyze different decoding algorithms for (QC-) MDPC codes
with respect to their error-correction capability and their resilience against the
GJS attack [9]. In particular, we present novel hard-decision message-passing
(MP) algorithms that are resilient against the GJS key-recovery attack from [9]
and have an improved error-correction capability compared to existing hard-
decision decoding schemes. We derive the density evolution (DE) for the novel
decoding schemes which allows to predict decoding thresholds as well as to op-
timize the parameters of the algorithm.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives basic definitions, describes
classical decoding schemes for LDPC/MDPC codes and analyzes their resilience
against the GJS attack by simulations. In Section 3 we propose new MP decod-
ing schemes that are able to defeat the GJS attack. To estimate the decoding
threshold we perform density evolution analysis of the novel schemes. Finally,
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
Denote the binary field by F2 and let the set of m × n matrices over F2 be
denoted by Fm×n. The set of all vectors of length n over F2 is denoted by Fn2 .
Vectors and matrices are denoted by bold lower-case and upper-case letters such
1 The existence of a moderate-density parity-check matrix for a binary linear block
code does not rule out the possibility that the same code fulfills a (much) sparser
parity-check matrix. As in most of the literature, we neglect the probability that a
code defined by a randomly-drawn moderate parity check matrix admits a sparser
parity-check matrix. Guarantees in this sense shall be derived based on random code
ensemble arguments.
3as a and A, respectively. A binary circulant matrix A of size Q is a Q × Q
matrix with coefficients in F2 obtained by cyclically shifting its first row a =
(a0, a1, . . . , aQ−1) to right, yielding
A =

a0 a1 · · · aQ−1
aQ−1 a0 · · · aQ−2
...
...
. . .
...
a1 a2 · · · a0
 .
The set of Q × Q circulant matrices together with the matrix multiplication
and addition forms a commutative ring and it is isomorphic to the polyno-
mial ring
(
F2[X]/
(
XQ − 1) ,+, ·). In particular, there is a bijective mapping
between a circulant matrix A and a polynomial a(X) = a0 + a1X + . . . +
aQ−1xQ−1 ∈ F2[X]. We indicate the vector of coefficients of a polynomial a(X)
as a = (a0, a1, . . . , aQ−1). The weight of a polynomial a(X) is the number of its
non-zero coefficients, i.e., it is the Hamming weight of its coefficient vector a.
We indicate both weights with the operator wht (·), i.e., wht (a(X)) = wht (a).
In the remainder of this paper we use the polynomial representation of circulant
matrices to provide an efficient description of the structure of the codes.
2.1 QC MDPC-based Cryptosystems
A new variant of the McEliece public-key cryptosystem that is based on QC-
MDPC codes was proposed in [8] The QC-MDPC McEliece cryptosystem allows
for a very simple description without the need for row and column scrambling
matrices. Due to the moderate density of the parity-check matrix, known decod-
ing attacks on the dual code [4] are defeated. The parity-check matrix consists
of blocks of Q ×Q circulant matrices which allows for very small key sizes due
to the compact description of the circulant blocks.
A binary MDPC code of length n, dimension k and row weight dc is defined
by a binary parity-check matrix H that contains a moderate number of dc ≈
O(√n log(n)) ones per row. For n = N0Q, dimension k = K0Q, redundancy
r = n − k = R0Q with R0 = N0 − K0 for some integer Q, the parity-check
matrix H(X) of a QC-MDPC2 code in polynomial form is a R0 ×N0 matrix.
Without loss of generality we consider in the following codes with r = Q
(i.e. R0 = 1). This family of codes covers a wide range of code rates and is of
particular interest for cryptographic applications since the parity check matrices
2 As in most of the recent literature on codes constructed from arrays of circulants, we
loosely define a code to be QC if there exists a permutation of its coordinates such
that the resulting (equivalent) code has the following property: if x is a codeword,
then any cyclic shift of x by ` positions is a codeword. For example, a code admitting
a parity-check matrix as an array of R0 ×N0 circulants does not fulfill the property
above. However the code is QC in the loose sense, since it is possible to permute its
coordinates to obtain a code for which every cyclic shift of a codeword by ` = N0
positions yields another codeword.
4can be characterized in a very compact way. The parity-check matrix of QC-
MDPC codes with r = Q has the form
H(X) =
(
h0(X) h1(X) . . . hN0−1(X)
)
. (1)
Let DECH(·) be an efficient decoder for the code defined by the parity-check
matrix H.
Key generation:
– Randomly generate a parity-check matrix H ∈ Fr×n2 of the form (1) with
wht (hi(X)) = d
(i)
c for i = 0, . . . , N0. The matrix H with row weight dc =∑N0−1
i=0 d
(i)
c is the private key.
– The public key is the corresponding binary k × n generator matrix in sys-
tematic form, i.e.,
G(X) =
1 g0(X). . . ...
1 gK0−1(X)
 .
The generator matrix G can be described by K0Q bits (public key size).
Encryption:
– To encrypt a plaintext u ∈ Fk2 a user computes the ciphertext c ∈ Fn2 using
the public key G as
c = uG+ e (2)
where e is an error vector uniformly chosen from all vectors from Fn2 of
Hamming weight wht (e) = e.
Decryption:
– To decrypt a ciphertext c the authorized recipient uses the private key
DECH(·) to obtain
uG = DECH(mG+ e).
– Since G is in systematic form the plaintext u corresponds to the first k bits
of uG.
2.2 A Reaction-Based Attack on the QC-MDPC McEliece
Cryptosystem
Beside the conventional key-recovery and decoding attacks based on informa-
tion set decoding, GJS proposed a reaction-based key-recovery attack on the
QC-MDPC McEliece cryptosystem [8] which is currently the most critical at-
tack against the scheme [11]. Efficient iterative decoding of LDPC/MDPC codes
5comes at the cost of decoding failures. For example, the MDPC codes proposed
in [8] are operated with a target decoding failure probability lower than 10−7.3
The GJS attack exploits the observation that the decoding failure probability
for some particularly chosen error patterns is correlated with the structure of
the secret key, i.e., the parity-check matrix H. We now describe briefly how the
attack proceeds.
The Lee distance dL between two entries at position i and j of a binary vector
a = (a0 a1 . . . an−1) is defined as [13]
dL(i, j)
def
= min {|i− j|, n− |i− j|} .
The Lee distance profile4 of a binary vector a of length Q is defined as
D(a)
def
= {d : ∃i, j ∈ (0, Q− 1) s.t. ai = aj = 1 and dL(i, j) = d}
where the maximum distance in D(a) is U = bQ2 c. The multiplicity µ(d) is de-
fined as the number of occurrences of distance d in the vector a. A binary vector
a is fully specified by its distance profile D(a) and thus can be reconstructed
with high probability from D(a) [9] (up to cyclic shifts).
Let Ψd be a set containing all binary vectors of length n with exactly t ones
that are placed as b t2c pairs with Lee distance d in the first Q positions of the
vector. By limiting the errors to the firstQ positions, only the first circulant block
h0(X) of the matrix H(X) will determine the result of the decoding procedure.
The GJS attack proceeds as follows:
– For d = 1, . . . , U generate error sets Ψd of size M each (with M being a
parameter defining, together with U , the number of attempts used by the
attacker).
– Send M ciphertexts (2) with e ∈ Ψd for all d = 1, . . . , U and measure the
frame error rate (FER).
Since the decoding failure probability is lower for e ∈ Ψd with d ∈ D(h0), i.e. if
µ(d) > 0, for sufficiently large M the measured FER can be used to determine
the distance profile D(h0). The vector h0 can then be reconstructed from the
distance profile D(h0) using the methods from [9].
The remaining blocks of H(X) in (1) can then be reconstructed via the
generator matrixG(X) using linear algebraic relations. The success on the attack
depends on how the systems deals with decoding failures since the FER can only
3 The MDPC code parameters chosen in [8] showed to empirically attain the target.
An interesting question is whether a randomly generated parity-check matrix would
yield the target decoding failure probability for the given set of code parameters. A
possible direction to address the question is by analyzing the MDPC code ensem-
ble concentration properties [12] in the finite block length regime under the given
decoding algorithm.
4 We use the term “Lee distance profile” instead of “distance spectrum” as in [8] to
avoid the confusion with the distance spectrum (i.e., wieght enumerator) in Hamming
metric of linear block codes.
6be measured if retransmissions are requested. Another important factor is which
decoding scheme is used. In [9, 14] it is shown that the GJS attack succeeds if
bit-flipping (BF) or belief propagation (BP) decoding algorithms are used.
In key exchange protocols the attack can be defeated by using ephemeral keys
(i.e. a new key pair for every key exchange) [15]. However, this protocol-based
fix can only be applied in very special scenarios.
2.3 Classical Decoding Algorithms
In the following we describe classical decoding algorithms for LDPC codes and
analyze their error-correction capability for MDPC codes as well as their re-
silience against the GJS attack. For decoding we map each ciphertext bit ci to
+1 if ci = 0 and −1 if ci = 1 yielding (with some abuse of notation) a cipher-
text c ∈ {+1,−1}n. We consider next iterative MP decoding on the Tanner
graph [16] of the code. A Tanner graph is a bipartite graph consisting of n vari-
able nodes (VNs) and r check nodes (CNs). A VN vj is connected to a CN ci
if the corresponding entry hi,j in the parity-check matrix is equal to 1. We con-
sider next only regular Tanner graphs, i.e, graphs for which the number of edges
emanating from each VN equals dv and the number of edges emanating from
each CN equals dc. We refer to dv and dc as variable and check node degree,
respectively. The neighborhood of a variable node v is N (v), and similarly N (c)
denotes the neighborhood of the check node c. We denote the messages from
VN vj to CN ci by mvj→ci and the messages from ci to vj by mci→vj . In the
following we omit the indices of VNs and CNs whenever they are clear from the
context.
Bit-Flipping For decryption in the QC-MDPC cryptosystem [8] an efficient BF
algorithm for LDPC codes (see e.g. [17, Alg. 5.4]) is considered. This algorithm
is often referred to as “Gallager’s bit-flipping” algorithm although it is different
from the algorithm proposed by Gallager in [18].
Given a ciphertext c, a threshold b ≤ r and a maximum number if iterations
Imax, the BF algorithm proceeds as follows. Each VN v is initialized with the
corresponding ciphertext bit c ∈ {+1,−1} and sends the message mv→c = c to
all neighboring CNs c ∈ N (v). The CNs send the messages
mc→v =
∏
v′∈N (c)
mv′→c (3)
to all neighboring VNs v ∈ N (c). Note, that (3) is equivalent to the modulo two
sum of all incoming messages considered over F2. Each variable nodes counts the
number of unsatisfied check equations (i.e the number of messages mc→v = −1)
and sends to its neighbors the “flipped” ciphertext bit if at least b parity-check
equations are unsatisfied, i.e.
mv→c =
{
−c if |{c′ ∈ N (v) : mc′→v = −1}| ≥ b
c otherwise.
(4)
7The algorithm terminates if either all checks are satisfied or the maximum num-
ber of iterations Imax is reached.
The error-correction capability of the BF algorithm depends on the choice of
the threshold b. In [19] the threshold b is selected as the maximum number of
unsatisfied parity-check equations at each iteration which is denoted by Maxupc.
Note, that with b = Maxupc the BF algorithm is no longer purely a MP algorithm
on the Tanner graph of the code since Maxupc has to be obtained by a global
entity.
In [8] it is suggested to compute b according to [18, p. 46, Eq. 4.16] which
will lead to suboptimal results since the BF decoder is different from the decoder
analyzed in [18, Sec. 4]. To reduce the average number of iterations the threshold
in [8] is chosen as b = Maxupc − δ, where δ is a small integer that is determined
empirically (see [8, Sec. 4]).
Gallager B An efficient binary MP decoder for LDPC codes, often referred to
as Gallager B, was presented an analyzed in [18]. Each VN v is initialized with
the corresponding ciphertext bit c ∈ {+1,−1}. The VN send the messages
mv→c =
{
−c if |{c′ ∈ N (v) \c : mc′→v = −c}| ≥ b
c else
. (5)
This means that in the first iteration VN v sends the message mv→c = c to all
neighboring CNs c ∈ N (v). The CNs send the messages
mc→v =
∏
v′∈N (c)\v
mv′→c (6)
to the neighboring VNs. After iterating (5), (6) at most Imax times, the final
decision is given by
cˆ =
{
−c if |{mc→v = −c}| > b
c else
. (7)
Comparing the CN operations (3) and (6), and the VN operations (4) and
(5), one can see the before mentioned difference between the BF algorithm an
Gallager B. For fixed (dv, dc) the average error correction capability over the
binary symmetric channel (BSC) for the ensemble of (dv, dc) LDPC codes can
be analyzed, in the limit of large block lengths, using the DE analysis [12, 18].
Following this approach, the optimal value (in the large block length limit) for
the parameter b can be determined by [18, Eq. 4.16].
Miladinovic-Fossorier (MF) Algorithm Two probabilistic variants of Gal-
lager’s algorithm B that improve upon the original version were proposed by
Miladinovic and Fossorier in [20, Sec. III.A]. We refer next to the two algo-
rithms as Miladinovic and Fossorier (MF) algorithms. At each iteration ` the
8VN to CN messages (5) in Gallager B are modified with a certain probability
p
(`)
e . By defining an initial value p
(0)
e = p∗ and a decrement pdec ≤ p∗, one can
compute p
(`)
e by
p(`)e =
{
p
(`−1)
e − pdec if p(`−1)e > pdec
0 else
. (8)
The VNs are initialized with the corresponding ciphertext bit c.
Variant 1 (MF-1): If the number of incoming CN messages different from c
that do not agree with c exceeds the threshold b, i.e. if |{c′ ∈ N (v) \c : mc′→v =
−c}| ≥ b, the VNs send the messages
mv→c =
{
−c with probability 1− p(`)e
c with probability p
(`)
e
and mv→c = c otherwise.
Variant 2 (MF-2): With respect MF-1, we shall now introduce the iteration
counter for the messages that are output by VNs and by CNs. At iteration `,
is the number of message at the input of a VN v sent by its neighboring CNs
exceeds the threshold b, i.e. if |{c′ ∈ N (v) \c : m(`−1)c′→v = −c}| ≥ b, the VN sends
the message
m(`)v→c =
{
−c with probability 1− p(`)e
m
(`−1)
v→c with probability p
(`)
e
while m
(`)
v→c = c otherwise.
The check node operation as well as the final decision remains the same as
in Gallager B (see (6) and (7)). In general, the second variant improves upon
the first variant in terms of the number of correctable errors [20]. By definition
the probability p
(`)
e has two degrees of freedom, namely p∗ and pdec, which are
subject to optimization. In general there is no close form optimization of these
two parameters except for using the DE analysis from [20] as a guideline.
Algorithm E A generalization of the Gallager B algorithm that exploits era-
sures, which we further refer to as Algorithm E, was introduced and analyzed
in [12, 21]. To incorporate erasures the decoder requires a ternary message al-
phabet {−1, 0,+1}, where 0 indicates an erasure. The VNs are initialized with
the corresponding ciphertext bit c and send the messages
mv→c = sign
ωc+ ∑
c′∈N (v)\c
mc′→v
 . (9)
Here, ω is a heuristic weighting factor that was proposed in [12] improve the
performance of Algorithm E. In [12] ω was allowed to change over iterations (to
9account for the increase of reliability of the CN messages as the iteration number
grows). We consider next the simple case where ω is kept constant through all
iterations. The check nodes operate the same way as in Gallager B, i.e the CNs
send the messages mc→v according to (6). After iterating (6) and (9) at most
Imax times, the final decision is made as
cˆ = sign
ωc+ ∑
c∈N (v)
mc→v
 .
In [12] a DE analysis for Algorithm E was derived which allows to compute
an estimate of the optimal weight ω. For odd dv Algorithm E is equivalent to
Gallager B with threshold b = dω+dv−12 e and thus is also vulnerable against the
GJS attack.
Belief Propagation (BP) Decoding BP decoding is a soft-decision decoding
algorithm that is optimum in the maximum a posteriori (MAP) sense over a
cycle-free Tanner graph. Each VN v is initialized with the log-likelihood ratios
mch = c ln
n− e
n
where c is ciphertext bit corresponding to v. The VNs send the messages
mv→c = mch +
∑
c′∈N (v)\c
mc′→v (10)
to the CNs. In turn, the CNs send the messages
mc→v = 2 tanh−1
 ∏
v′∈N (c)\v
tanh
(mv′→c
2
) . (11)
After iterating (10), (11) at most Imax times, the final decision at each VN is
made as
cˆ = sign
mch + ∑
c∈N (v)
mc→v
 . (12)
It was conjectured for QC-MDPC codes [8] and finally shown for QC-LDPC
codes [14] that the GJS attack is also successful for QC-MDPC McEliece cryp-
tosystems under BP decoding.
2.4 Simulation Results
We now present simulation results of the GJS attack on variants of the QC-
MDPC cryptosystem using the above described schemes. We consider next an
10
QC-MDPC code ensemble C with n = 9602 and k = 4801 and parity-check
matrix in the form
H(X) = (h0(X) h1(X))
where h0(X) and h1(X) are two polynomials of degree less than 4801 and
wht (h0) = wht (h1) = 45. The ensemble C was proposed in [8] for 80 bit se-
curity. To analyze the resilience against the GJS attack, we performed Monte
Carlo simulations for codes randomly picked from C collecting up to 200 de-
coding failures (frame errors) with Imax = 50 iterations. For each multiplicity in
D(h0), 11 different error sets Ψd (simulation points) were simulated. As in [14]
the weight of the error patterns was chosen such that the FER is high enough
to be easily observable in the simulations.
Figure 1 shows the simulation results for one code from C . The results show
that except the MF decoding algorithm, all considered schemes are vulnerable
against GJS attack. For the MF decoding scheme the probability p
(`)
e was chosen
such that the FER for all multiplicities appearing in D(h0) are similar. Hence,
the distance profile D(h0) can not be reconstructed if the MF decoding scheme
with the appropriate choice of pe is used. Since simulations of different codes
from C show very similar results we conjecture that the choice of p
(`)
e rather
depends on the ensemble than on the code.
3 Secret Key Concealment via Modified Iterative
Decoding
In this section we propose new methods to modify MP decoding algorithms
that admit erasures. The methods allow to modify MP decoding algorithms in
a probabilistic manner to make them resilient against the GJS attack for an
appropriate choice of the decoding parameters. The main idea is, that similar to
the MF decoding scheme (see Sec. 2.3), we modify the VN to CN messages at
each iteration with a given probability. In particular, we modify the MP decoder
such that the messages mv→c are erased (i.e., set to 0) under certain conditions
with a given probability p
(`)
e . Remarkably, we will see how this results also in
an improved error-correction capability. In the following we will refer to this
approach as random erasure message-passing (REMP) decoding and we apply
it to modify Algorithm E.
3.1 First Modification of Algorithm E (REMP-1)
We modify Algorithm E such that any nonzero message mv→c in iteration ` is
erased with probability p
(`)
e . At the VNs we first compute a temporary output
message
m˜v→c = sign
ωc+ ∑
c′∈N (v)\c
mc′→v
 .
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Fig. 1. GJS reaction-based attack on the code ensemble C with (a) BF decoding, (b)
MF decoding, (c) Algorithm E and (d) BP decoding. The Monte Carlo simulation is
performed with 11 simulation points per multiplicity, Imax = 50 and stopping criterion
of 200 decoding failures. Except for the MF-2 decoding scheme, the distance profile
D(h0) can be reconstructed from the simulation results.
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If the message m˜v→c is not an erasure, i.e. if m˜v→c 6= 0, the VN sends
mv→c =
{
m˜c→v with probability 1− p(`)e
0 with probability p
(`)
e
(13)
and mv→c = 0 else. At the CNs we perform the same operation as in Algorithm
E (see (6)). The final decision, after iterating (6) and (13) at most Imax times,
is given by (18). As for the MF algorithm, the probability p
(`)
e may be decreased
as ` grows following (8).
Density Evolution Analysis Based on the analysis of Algorithm E in [12], we
derive the DE analysis of our modified algorithm from Sec. 3.1. Let p
(`)
z denote
the probability that a VN to CN message sent at iteration ` is equal to z ∈
{−1, 0,+1}. Similarly, let q(`)z denote the probability that a CN to VN message
sent at iteration ` is equal to z ∈ {−1, 0,+1}. The encryption step (2) can
be considered as the transmission of a codeword mG over a binary symmetric
channel with crossover probability e/n. For the analysis we assume w.l.o.g. that
all ciphertext bits ci are equal to +1 (all-zero codeword). Hence, we initialize
the probabilities p
(0)
+1 = 1− e/n, p(0)−1 = e/n and p(0)1 = 0.
The CN operation of REMP-1 remains the same as in Algorithm E (see [12])
and thus we have
q
(`)
+1 =
1
2
[(
p
(`−1)
+1 + p
(`−1)
−1
)dc−1
+
(
p
(`−1)
+1 − p(`−1)−1
)dc−1]
(14)
q
(`)
−1 =
1
2
[(
p
(`−1)
+1 + p
(`−1)
−1
)dc−1 − (p(`−1)+1 − p(`−1)−1 )dc−1] (15)
q
(`)
0 =1−
(
1− p(`−1)0
)dc−1
. (16)
The probability p
(`)
+1 can be expressed as
p
(`)
+1 =
(
1− p(`)e
)
×(
p
(0)
0
∑
(i,j):
i−j>0
(
dv − 1
i, j, dv − 1− i− j
)(
q
(`)
+1
)i (
q
(`)
−1
)j (
q
(`)
0
)dv−1−i−j
+ p
(0)
+1
∑
(i,j):
i−j>−ω
(
dv − 1
i, j, dv − 1− i− j
)(
q
(`)
+1
)i (
q
(`)
−1
)j (
q
(`)
0
)dv−1−i−j
+ p
(0)
−1
∑
(i,j):
i−j>ω
(
dv − 1
i, j, dv − 1− i− j
)(
q
(`)
+1
)i (
q
(`)
−1
)j (
q
(`)
0
)dv−1−i−j )
.
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The probability p
(`)
−1 is given by
p
(`)
−1 =
(
1− p(`)e
)
×(
p
(0)
0
∑
(i,j):
i−j<0
(
dv − 1
i, j, dv − 1− i− j
)(
q
(`)
+1
)i (
q
(`)
−1
)j (
q
(`)
0
)dv−1−i−j
+ p
(0)
+1
∑
(i,j):
i−j<−ω
(
dv − 1
i, j, dv − 1− i− j
)(
q
(`)
+1
)i (
q
(`)
−1
)j (
q
(`)
0
)dv−1−i−j
+ p
(0)
−1
∑
(i,j):
i−j<ω
(
dv − 1
i, j, dv − 1− i− j
)(
q
(`)
+1
)i (
q
(`)
−1
)j (
q
(`)
0
)dv−1−i−j )
.
Finally, the probability p
(`)
0 is given by
p
(`)
0 =1− p(`)+1 − p(`)−1.
Note that since in our scenario we do not have erasures in the ciphertext we
have p
(0)
0 = 0 which allows to simplify the expressions above.
3.2 Second Modification of Algorithm E (REMP-2)
In the second modification of Algorithm E from Sec. 2.3 the messages mv→c
at iteration ` are erased (i.e. set to mv→c = 0) with probability p
(`)
e if they
contradict the corresponding ciphertext bit c. At the VNs we first compute a
temporary output message
m˜v→c = sign
ωc+ ∑
c′∈N (v)\c
mc′→v
 .
If the message m˜v→c contradicts the ciphertext bit c, i.e. if we have m˜v→c = −c,
the VN sends
mv→c =
{
m˜c→v with probability 1− p(`)e
0 with probability p
(`)
e
(17)
and mv→c = m˜c→v otherwise. At the check nodes we perform the same operation
as in Algorithm E (see (6)). The final decision, after iterating (6) and (17) at
most Imax times, is given by
cˆ = sign
ωc+ ∑
c∈N (v)
mc→v
 . (18)
Again, as for the MF algorithm, the probability p
(`)
e may be decreased as ` grows
following (8).
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Density Evolution Based on the analysis of Algorithm E in [12], we derive
the DE analysis of our modified algorithm from Sec. 3.2.
Since the CN operation is the same as in Algorithm E, we can compute
q
(`)
+1, q
(`)
−1 and q
(`)
0 using (14), (15) and (16), respectively. The probability p
(`)
+1 can
be expressed as
p
(`)
+1 =p
(0)
0
∑
(i,j):
i−j>0
(
dv − 1
i, j, dv − 1− i− j
)(
q
(`)
+1
)i (
q
(`)
−1
)j (
q
(`)
0
)dv−1−i−j
+p
(0)
+1
∑
(i,j):
i−j>−ω
(
dv − 1
i, j, dv − 1− i− j
)(
q
(`)
+1
)i (
q
(`)
−1
)j (
q
(`)
0
)dv−1−i−j
+
(
1− p(`)e
)
p
(0)
−1
∑
(i,j):
i−j>ω
(
dv − 1
i, j, dv − 1− i− j
)(
q
(`)
+1
)i (
q
(`)
−1
)j (
q
(`)
0
)dv−1−i−j
.
The probability p
(`)
−1 is given by
p
(`)
−1 =1− p(`)+1 − p(`)0
=p
(0)
0
∑
(i,j):
i−j<0
(
dv − 1
i, j, dv − 1− i− j
)(
q
(`)
+1
)i (
q
(`)
−1
)j (
q
(`)
0
)dv−1−i−j
+
(
1− p(`)e
)
p
(0)
+1
∑
(i,j):
i−j<−ω
(
dv − 1
i, j, dv − 1− i− j
)(
q
(`)
+1
)i (
q
(`)
−1
)j (
q
(`)
0
)dv−1−i−j
+p
(0)
−1
∑
(i,j):
i−j<ω
(
dv − 1
i, j, dv − 1− i− j
)(
q
(`)
+1
)i (
q
(`)
−1
)j (
q
(`)
0
)dv−1−i−j
.
Finally, the probability p
(`)
0 can then be expressed as
p
(`)
0 =1− p(`)+1 − p(`)−1.
As before, note that since in our scenario we do not have erasures in the cipher-
text we have p
(0)
0 = 0 which allows to simplify the expressions above.
3.3 Masked Belief Propagation (MBP) Decoding
Using the ideas from the MF algorithm we now modify the classical BP decoding
algorithm (see Sec. 2.3) in order to counteact the GJS attack. We set
mch = c ln
n− e
n
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where c is ciphertext bit corresponding to v. The VNs first compute the tempo-
rary messages
m˜v→c = mch +
∑
c′∈N (v)\c
mc′→v.
If the sign of m˜v→c is not equal to the sign of mch, i.e. if sign(m˜v→c) 6= sign(mch),
then the VN sends the message
mv→c =
{
m˜v→c with probability 1− p(`)e
mch with probability p
(`)
e
(19)
and mv→c = m˜v→c otherwise. In other words, if the sign of a message that is
supposed so be sent by VN v is different from the sign of the corresponding
initial value mch, then with probability p
(`)
e the initial value mch is sent. The
CNs operation remains the same as in (11). After iterating (19), (11) at most
Imax times, the final decision at each VN is made according to (12). For masked
belief propagation (MBP) decoding we do not provide an explicit description on
how DE has to be modified since the analysis can be carried out by applying
minor changes to quantized DE [22].
We shall see next that, due to the modified operation at the VNs, the MBP
algorithm allows to conceal the structure of H(X) by tuning the probability
p
(`)
e . We empirically verified that the idea of introducing random erasures as
in Sec. 3.1 and Sec. 3.2 does not conceal the structure of H(X) for BP de-
coding. Moreover, we will see that, differently from the REMP modifications of
Algorithm E, the modification of BP decoding comes at the cost of a reduced
error correction performance. Thus, the decoding algorithms from Sec. 3.1 and
Sec. 3.2 are preferable since they show a similar performance at a lower decoding
complexity.
3.4 Performance Analysis & Simulation Results
Density Evolution Analysis We first analyze the error-correction capability
of the two modifications of Algorithm E from Sec 3.1 and Sec. 3.2. As first
estimate of the code performance, we employ the DE analysis [12] to determine
the iterative decoding threshold of a (dv, dc) unstructured LDPC code ensemble
over a BSC with error probability ∆. The decoding threshold is denoted as ∆?
and represents the largest channel error probability for which, in the limit of
large n and large Imax, the bit error probability of code picked randomly from
the ensemble becomes vanishing small [12]. We then get a rough estimate on the
error correction capability as5
δ? = bn∆?c.
5 Note that at the decoding threshold ∆? a vanishing small bit error probability may
not imply a vanishing small block error probability. However, for the regular MDPC
ensembles under consideration the threshold on the bit error probability and the
one on the block error probability do coincide over binary-input output-symmetric
memoryless channel under BP decoding [23]. In our estimate, we implicitly assume
that the result extends to Algorithm E and its variants.
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Note that, for a moderate block length n, δ? provides only a coarse estimate
to the number of errors at which we expect the FER to rapidly decrease (so-
called waterfall region), with the accuracy of the prediction improving as n grows
large. With a slight abuse of the wording, we refer to δ? as decoding threshold
as well. We further denote the decoding threshold under Algorithm E, REMP-
1 and REMP-2 as δ?E, δ
?
1 and δ
?
2 , respectively. The decoding thresholds do not
only depend on the selected algorithm, but also on the algorithm parameters.
The results for the (9602, 4801) MDPC ensemble with dv = 45 and dc = 90
are summarized in Table 1. For Algorithm E, the value of ω has been chosen
to maximize the decoding threshold. Remarkably, the variants REMP-1 and
REMP-2 do not yield a threshold degradation, and in some cases they even
provide slight gains for suitable choices of the parameters (ω, p∗, pdec).
Table 1. Decoding thresholds of Algorithm E and it variants for the MDPC code
ensembles with the parameters from [8, Tab. 2].
REMP-1 REMP-2 Alg. E
Security Level n dc dv p
∗ pdec δ?1 (ω) p
∗ pdec δ?2 (ω) δ
?
E (ω)
80 9602 90 45 0.001 0 107(13) 0.1 0 108(13) 106(14)
128 19714 142 71 0.1 0.001 153(18) 0.76 0 157(14) 153(18)
256 65542 274 137 0.002 0.0002 296(27) 0.65 0 301(23) 294(26)
Simulation Results To validate the performance estimates obtained through
DE, we simulated the error-correction capability of the decoding schemes from
Section 2.3 and Section 3. The results in terms of FER as a function of the
error pattern weight are depicted in Figure 2. The results confirm the trend pre-
dicted by the DE analysis. In particular, the error-correction capability improves
upon existing decoding algorithms. Even for erasure probability values chosen
to conceal the structure of H(X) (yielding a suboptimal choice with respect to
the error correction performance), REMP-2 outperforms Algorithm E and the
BF/MF algorithms.
3.5 Resilience against the GJS Attack
We now analyze the resilience of the proposed decoding schemes against the
GJS attack. For the REMP variants of Algorithm E as well as for the MBP de-
coder we performed Monte Carlo simulations for codes randomly picked from C
collecting up to 200 decoding failures (frame errors) with Imax = 50 iterations.
For each multiplicity in D(h0), 11 different error sets Ψd (simulation points)
were simulated. The simulation results in Figure 3 show that, for an appropri-
ate choice of parameters, the REMP-1 and REMP-2 decoding schemes have a
similar FER for all multiplicities appearing in D(h0). Hence, the reconstruction
of the distance profile D(h0) from the observed FER is not possible.
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Fig. 2. Error-correction performance (FER) over the weight of the error patterns. The
figure shows that the proposed REMP schemes significantly improve upon existing
hard-decision decoding schemes.
Figure 4 shows that for an appropriate choice of parameters also the MBP
algorithm is able to conceal the structure of the secret key. For the choice of
parameters that conceal the secret key the FER of MBP decoding and REMP-2
decoding at error weight e = 106 is similar. Hence, due to the higher complexity
of MBP, the REMP scheme is preferable.
To conceal the structure of H(X) the choice of p
(`)
e for a particular error
weight e is crucial. If p
(`)
e is chosen too large the picture is inverted, i.e. higher
multiplicities have a higher FER than lower multiplicities. Thus the error weight
e should be computed after decoding and ciphers generated with an error weight
different from e should be rejected to prevent attacks that exploit this effect.
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Fig. 3. GJS reaction-based attack on the code ensemble C with (a) decoding, (b)
decoding. The Monte Carlo simulation is performed with 11 simulation points per
multiplicity, Imax = 50 and stopping criterion of 200 decoding failures. The results
show that the distance profile D(h0) cannot be reconstructed from the simulation
results.
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Fig. 4. GJS reaction-based attack on the code ensemble C with MBP decoding.
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4 Conclusions
We analyzed classical iterative decoding schemes for moderate-density parity-
check (MDPC) codes with respect to their error-correction capability as well
as their resilience against a recent key-recovery attack by Guo, Johansson and
Stankovski (GJS). The simulation results show that a decoding scheme by Mi-
ladinovic and Fossorier (MF) is able to defeat the attack for an appropriate
choice of decoding parameters.
A new decoding method called random erasure message-passing (REMP)
that allows to improve existing message-passing (MP) decoding algorithms with
respect to their error-correction capability as well as their resilience against the
GJS attack was proposed. Two REMP variants of an existing MP decoder that
have an improved error-correction performance for MDPC codes compared to
existing schemes were presented and analyzed. The simulation results show that
the proposed REMP schemes are able to defeat the GJS attack for an appropriate
choice of decoding parameters.
A new variant of the belief propagation decoding algorithm that is able to
resist the GJS attack was presented.
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